APPELLANT'S BRIEF APPENDIX B

Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Appoint a Trustee

1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT		
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
3	X		
4	In Re: Case No. 06-22306		
5	BAYOU GROUP, LLC : June 29, 2006		
6	:		
7	Debtor. : 300 Quarrapos StreetX White Plains, NY		
8	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION		
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ADLAI S. HARDIN, JR. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE		
10	ONTIND BINIDS BIRMOTTOT CODE		
11	APPEARANCES:		
12	For the Debtors: H. JEFFREY SCHWARTZ, ESQ. Dechert LLP		
13	30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10112		
14	ELISE SCHERR FREJKA, ESQ.		
15	Dechert LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza		
16	New York, New York 10112		
17	GARY MENNITT, ESQ. Dechert LLP		
18	30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10112		
19			
20	For Official Committee HOWARD W. SHAUB, ESQ. Of Unsecured Creditors: Kasowitz, Benson, Torres		
21	& Friedman, LLP 1633 Broadway		
22	New York, New York 10019		
23	For Official Committee of RICHARD KIRBY, ESQ. Unsecured Creditors: Preston Gates, Ellis &		
24	Rouvelas Meeds, LLP 1735 New York Avenue NW		
25	Suite 500 Washington, D.C., 20006-5209		

1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
2	SOUTHE	IRN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	For the United States Trustees Office:	ELIZABETH AUSTIN, ESQ. LISA LAMBERT, ESQ.	
4		DIANA ADAMS 33 Whitehall Street	
5		21st Floor New York, New York 10004	
6	For Eric and Diane	PHILLIP BENTLEY, ESQ.	
7	Garfinkel:	<pre>Kramer, Levin, Naftalis, & Frankel, LLP</pre>	
8		919 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022	
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12	,		
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service

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             THE COURT: Bayou. Hello.
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             MS. DAWSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth
   Austin, Assistant United States Trustee for the Southern
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   District of New York. With me today is Lisa Lambert, Trial
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   Attorney.
             THE COURT: Hello.
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             MS. DAWSON: Southern District of New York as well as
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   the acting United States Trustee Diane Adams [Ph.].
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              THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Adams, hello.
              MR. SCHWARTZ: Good morning -- good afternoon, Your
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   Honor -- good morning, Your Honor. I apologize that we're a
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   bit late.
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              THE COURT: Good morning. We've got a lot of morning
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   left.
              MR. SCHWARTZ: Indeed, and we're looking forward to
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    it. Jeffrey Schwartz from Dechert, LLP on behalf of the
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   debtors in possession. With me is Gary Mennitt and Elise
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   Frejka.
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              MR. MENNITT: Good morning.
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              MR. SCHWARTZ: And we have Mr. Marwil, the managing
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   member of each of the Bayou --
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              THE COURT: Hello, Mr. Marwil.
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              MR. SCHWARTZ: -- entities with us as well, Your
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            Thank you.
    Honor.
              MR. KIRBY: Good morning, Your Honor. Richard Kirby
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   from the law firm of Preston, Gates from Washington, D.C. on
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   behalf of the official unsecured creditors committee. With me
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   is co-counsel Howard Schub from the Kasowitz, Benson firm.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. SCHUB: Good morning.
             THE COURT: Sir?
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             MR. BENTLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Philip
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   Bentley of Kramer, Levin on behalf of Eric and Diane Garfinkel
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    [Ph.].
                          Okay. And the Garfinkels. Let me ask
              THE COURT:
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   Ms. Austin, are you going to be the voice?
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              MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor. I'll be making the
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   argument today.
              THE COURT: Let me tell you the fundamental problem
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    that I -- or problems that I have, but before I do that, I'd
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    like to ask two questions.
              Number one, does the U.S. Trustee's Office perceive
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    any defect, legal or otherwise, in Judge McMahon's order
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    appointing Mr. Marwil as receiver with the portfolio that the
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    order that she signed provides?
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              MS. AUSTIN: The prepetition order of the District
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    Court, Your Honor. It thoroughly is an appropriate order that
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    appoints a receiver.
              THE COURT: It is.
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              MS. AUSTIN: It's a federal receiver.
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             THE COURT: It is appropriate, not inappropriate.
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             MS. AUSTIN: It is not an inappropriate order for the
   appointment of a federal receiver and we don't dispute
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   Mr. Marwil's qualifications to serve as that federal receiver.
              THE COURT: Okay. My next question was going to be
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   if there is a problem with the District Court order surely this
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   court is not the right court to deal with the problem, is it?
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             MS. AUSTIN: That's --
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              THE COURT: They may be -- the District Court may be
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    the right court to deal with the problem with one of my orders,
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   but I don't perceive I as the right person to deal with any
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   problems with the District Court order. Correct?
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              MS. AUSTIN: That's correct, Your Honor. We don't
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    see a problem with the District Court order --
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              THE COURT: Okay. It's --
              MS. AUSTIN: -- per se.
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              THE COURT: -- lawful, proper and enforceable.
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              MS. AUSTIN: Correct, Your Honor.
18
                          Okay. The next question is --
              THE COURT:
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              MS. AUSTIN: But, Your Honor, it is pursuant to
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    Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code stayed at this juncture.
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                          I'm sorry?
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              THE COURT:
              MS. AUSTIN: It is pursuant to Section 362 of the
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    Bankruptcy Code stayed. I mean, the filing of the Bankruptcy
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    Court even stays litigation that is before the Supreme Court,
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to the court order itself is stayed pursuant to Section 362.

THE COURT: Is that in your papers? That's a shocking notion to me that is -- it's more than surprising.

MS. AUSTIN: Well, I mean, it is obviously subject to 543 and the receiver's rights as a custodian under Section 543, but for all other aspects, yes, Your Honor, it is stay. I mean, that's a basic tenantment of bankruptcy law that prepetition court orders, regardless of the Court, are stayed upon the filing of the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's something you're going to have to brief and you're going to have to show me. I can't imagine that the judge's order -- the District Court order appointing Mr. Marwil is stayed.

MS. AUSTIN: Subject to the provisions of Section 553 -- 43, excuse me.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me tell you the fundamental problem that I have with your position here.

Mr. Marwil is called a receiver, but Judge McMahon's order goes well beyond that. And it is the beyond that aspect of Judge McMahon's order that I believe your motion ignores. Maybe I should look specifically at the order.

It's a lengthy order, but I'm just going to quote that portion of the order that's quoted at page 12 of the Dechert Price or the Dechert memorandum. It says, "Corporate governance," colon. This is from the order, correct, sir?

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MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, Your Honor, verbatim.

THE COURT: "Corporate governance: Pursuant to 28
USC § 959(b), [Marwil shall] succeed to be the sole and
exclusive managing member and representative of each of the
Bayou Entities with the sole and exclusive power and authority
to manage and direct the business and financial affairs of the
Bayou Entities, including without limitation, the authority to
petition for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC §

110" -- excuse me -- "§ 101 et seq.) For any or all of the
Bayou Entities and in connection therewith be and be deemed a
debtor in possession for any or all of the Bayou Entities in
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the code, and prosecute such
adversary proceedings and other matters as may be permitted
under the code and/or applicable law."

Now, what you're asking me to do by your motion is to supplant Mr. Marwil as the debtor in possession or as the manager of the debtor in possession with the sole and exclusive authority to operate the debtors in possession.

You're asking me to supplant Mr. Marwil with a trustee. The problem that I have is that you are asking me to confound the District Court order, and I don't know how I can possibly do that.

MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think if you want to do that, don't you need to move for relief from the District Court order in the

District Court which issued the order and which made perfectly clear that Mr. Marwil is not just a receiver? He is the managing member. He is the person in charge. He is management of each of these debtors given under Judge McMahon's order.

The power to operate as debtor in possession each of these entities and you're seeking to supplant Mr. Marwil, not just as receiver, but as a person who has the authority given to him by Judge McMahon to operate as debtor in possession.

Not trustee. Debtor in possession.

You've got to help me with that, because otherwise, I have no way that I can see that I can rule in your favor.

MS. AUSTIN: Certainly, Your Honor. I think the key language of what this order says it says, "As may be permitted under the code or applicable law." I have no doubt that the District Court was attempting to basically erase the provisions of Section 543 or erase --

THE COURT: Just a second. You -- let's go to the -- MS. AUSTIN: -- the provisions of 1104.

THE COURT: -- Code right now, then. What is the provision that you say would be erased?

MS. AUSTIN: Section 543, Your Honor. The -
THE COURT: Okay. Let's look at it. Section 543 is
headed -- entitled, rather, "Turnover of property by a
custodian." Okay.

This is not a custodian. Mr. Marwil is not simply a

custodian. He is not a custodian any more than had the District Court approved the appointment of a new board of directors, a new president, somebody with a title other than receiver. In fact, I'm not sure -- I haven't studied her order that carefully. It's many pages long. But I don't know how many times the word "receiver" appears, other than the title in the order. But the substance of the order is that Mr. Marwil is not simply a custodian. He is given the management of these entities. He is the new board of directors, the new president, CEO, whatever title you want. That's the nature of his responsibilities.

And lest there be any doubt about it, the order that Judge McMahon signed states that "In connection therewith," namely his having the "sole and exclusive power and authority to manage and direct the business and financial affairs of the Bayou Entities." In connection with that it says, "... and in connection therewith be and be deemed a debtor in possession for any or all of the Bayou Entities in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Code" So this -- we're not dealing with a custodian or a receiver. Section 543 has no application.

MS. AUSTIN: Well, Your Honor, once again I'd point out that the key words in that order is "as permitted by the Bankruptcy Code." Mr. Marwil was, indeed, appointed as a receiver under those applicable federal laws, which allow the District Court to appoint a receiver.

Under the Bankruptcy Code definitions of a custodian under Section 101(11)(a) and (c) -- actually (c) "trustee receiver or agent under applicable law or under a contract that is appointed or authorized to take charge of the property of the debtor for purposes of enforcing a lien against the property for the purposes of general administration of such property with benefit of the debtor's creditors is, indeed, a custodian under the Bankruptcy Code."

THE COURT: All right. Then what you're now saying -- this is reason I asked you the first question I asked you -- what you're now saying is that Judge McMahon entered an order that she did not have power to enter. And if that's your argument, then this is the wrong court to address that argument, because it is crystal clear that the purpose of Judge McMahon's order was to appoint somebody who was in fact and law the equivalent of a new board of directors, new CEO, new president, new CFO as a debtor in possession. And so we are not simply dealing here with a custodian or a receiver.

Now, if you think the Court didn't have power to do that, then this is not the Court to reverse Judge McMahon's order. I won't do it. I haven't the power to do it and I won't do it.

In addition, in terms of the appointment of a receiver under Section 1104, is it?

MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor. Appointment of trustee

under 1104.

appointment of a trustee under Section 1104, aside from your argument that Mr. Marwil is a receiver or a custodian, there is no ground asserted in your motion to oust Mr. Marwil from the management of these debtors as debtor in possession. There's been no allegation of incompetence, impropriety, dishonesty, none of the grounds normally associated with the displacement of management and the appointment of a trustee has been asserted in your motion. The only ground you've asserted has cause for the appointment of a trustee is that he's really a receiver and a custodian. But it is perfectly clear to me that he's really not just a receiver or a custodian, so is there anything else?

MS. AUSTIN: Well, Your Honor, I'd just simply point out that obviously we have issues with the -- our main issues here are with respect to the standing and the procedural concerns that someone who is not properly vested fiduciary for the state proceeding to management --

THE COURT: But you see, when you say that you are saying that Judge McMahon did not have the power to invest Mr. Marwil with the capacity to act as the proper fiduciary manager of these debtors. And therefore, what you're saying is that she exceeded her power and violated the law. And if that's --

12 1 MS. AUSTIN: I don't think that --THE COURT: -- your argument, you're going to have to 2 3 take it somewhere else, Your Honor. MS. AUSTIN: I understand, Your Honor. I think it is 4 our position that that was not her intention, that once --5 THE COURT: That what was not her intention? 6 MS. AUSTIN: To supplant the Bankruptcy Code, to 7 supplant Section 524 and supplant 1104, but we hear what you're 8 saying. 9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 10 MS. AUSTIN: For that reason, Your Honor, then we 11 would respectfully request to withdraw the reference so that 12 13 this matter can be considered --THE COURT: Well, you'll have to ask --14 MS. AUSTIN: -- by this court. 15 THE COURT: You'll have to ask Judge McMahon to do 16 17 that in a proper motion. MS. AUSTIN: But I will also note, Your Honor, that 18 the U.S. Trustee's Office was obviously not involved at the 19 District Court level. We were not given notice that this order 20 was being entered in. Obviously, we were only aware of this 21 once the bankruptcy was filed. We obviously would have had no 22 standing at the time the order was entered, because until a 23 24 bankruptcy is filed --25 THE COURT: Right.

MS. AUSTIN: -- there is no standing for the U.S. Trustee's Office to appear and be heard --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. AUSTIN: -- even if we had been made aware of the order. We are obviously clearly quite concerned with the precedential affect of an order like this. Whereas there may not be bad results in this case, we understand what Your Honor is saying, and we had -- there's actually no per se rule against a receiver becoming a trustee and certainly that is -- whereas the U.S. Trustee's Office can't commit ahead of time --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. AUSTIN: -- as to who would be the trustee, we certainly would listen to the parties and assuming Mr. Marwil meets the disinterested standardness, that will all be taken into consideration so it's not as if we're trying to necessarily displace Mr. Marwil. We're trying to get it into the proper procedural format. And we have --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. AUSTIN: We're not here to be obstructionists. We do have a very grave concern with regard to the --

THE COURT: I have no doubt about your good faith and your not wanting to be obstructionists. That's not the question. The question is whether or not I have the power to enter an order that I believe would clearly be in defiance of the order that Judge McMahon has entered.

There just can be no question about it. The provision that is quoted at page 12, and there are other provisions as well. I'm not going to burden the record, but there are other provisions of Judge McMahon's order.

For example, Paragraph 23, "The Court retains jurisdiction with respect to any matters addressed to" -- excuse me -- "addressed in this order including without limitation any and all matters relating to or affecting the receivership estate, the Bayou assets, the receiver, and the scope of authority granted the receiver hereunder." I don't have that authority under Judge McMahon's order.

Paragraph 22, "Except as expressly stated herein, nothing in this order shall be construed to impair, limit, or constrain the receiver's powers under any federal rule of civil procedure, any statute of the United States or any decisional authority construing the powers of or procedural mechanisms available to federal equity receivers."

For me to enter the order displacing Mr. Marwil would clearly confound Paragraph 22 of Judge McMahon's order.

MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor, may I take a moment to consult with my client?

THE COURT: Just a moment.

Paragraph 15, "The receiver may be removed at any time by the Court" and the Court is the District Court, "or upon the request of the committee or its successors for cause

as approved by the Court, and a successor shall be named by the Court, after notice to the committee or its successor."

And then the next sentence of Paragraph 15, "In the event that the receiver resigns from office, the receiver shall first provide written notice to the committee or its successor, and such resignation shall not be effective until the Court appoints a successor under such conditions as the Court may order." The court in that paragraph is the District Court, not the Bankruptcy Court.

There are other provisions of Judge McMahon's order which I think would clearly be utterly confounded by my granting of the motion and entering an order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee, and thereby displacing Mr. Marwil as the person with "the sole and exclusive power and authority to manage and direct the business and financial affairs of the Bayou Entities including ... in connection therewith to be and be deemed a debtor in possession for any and all of the Bayou Entities in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Code."

MS. AUSTIN: Well, it --

THE COURT: I just can't imagine any order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee that wouldn't absolutely decimate these provisions that I've averted to in Judge McMahon's order, and this is not the Judge that's going to do that. You can either appeal and get it before the District Court that way, you can move before Judge McMahon for the relief you seek here, you can

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   move to withdraw the reference, you -- whatever, but this isn't
    the Court to enter an order that completely and totally
   undermines what Judge McMahon did.
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              MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor, we're here obviously because
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   we believe Your Honor has jurisdiction --
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              THE COURT: Right.
              MS. AUSTIN: -- over this proceeding. And for
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    example --
              THE COURT: I do have jurisdiction over this
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   proceeding.
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              MS. AUSTIN: But isn't it -- with theory under that
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    reading of this order, if Mr. Marwil were to, heaven forbid, do
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    something wrong and there were a basis to seek his removal,
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    appointment of a trustee, wouldn't -- couldn't the same
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    argument be made with this --
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              THE COURT: That might give you --
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              MS. AUSTIN: -- order that --
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              THE COURT: -- ground under 1104 to make a motion in
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    this court. Now -- because at least you would then have cause,
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    but you have no cause here other than that he's been appointed
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    by the District Court.
              MS. AUSTIN: Then obviously our position is that he's
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    a custodian.
              THE COURT: Now, it may well be if he did something
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    wrong that even in that circumstance the proper court to
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redress that would be Judge McMahon given the various provisions of her order.

ruling.

I express no view on it, since that's not before me, but as it is, I'm sorry, but I have to deny your motion because it would plainly and --

MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor, I would -- if you may, I would ask you to defer ruling so that we may consider withdrawing the reference to seeing if Judge McMahon may be willing to --

THE COURT: I'm going to rule. It doesn't make any difference whether I rule or withhold the ruling. As I say, it's very easy to get it before the District Court either by appealing my denial of the motion or moving to withdraw the reference or making a motion before a judge, because you don't know which district judge you'd get, I suppose, with either of those motions; or you could make a motion directly before Judge McMahon seeking leave from her to displace the person she appointed as the manager of these entities with somebody that you would appoint. Hey, give it a shot, but I'm not the person that can do it. Fair enough?

MS. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know you don't agree, but that's the

MS. AUSTIN: I wouldn't have filed the motion if I thought otherwise.

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz, I didn't give you a chance to argue on it and I know you would have made far more impressive and compendious arguments than I could even think of, but these are the reasons that I'm denying the motion.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I'm -- and we agree with every legal conclusion you've drawn. I'm --

THE COURT: I express relief at that.

MR. SCHWARTZ: And we applaud it and once the shoes are sold, one should not continue selling, which is a rule of thumb. But I wanted to make just one statement for the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SCHWARTZ: And that is, there was a reference to Section 362 of the Code. 362 of the Code does not apply to corporate governance. All it -- just by way of background, and this was described somewhat in the papers -- the corporate governance provision, as with the other provisions in the District Court order were very carefully crafted with this circumstance in mind.

I would -- at the risk of being pelted by others perhaps in the courtroom, I would certainly acknowledge that all that was achieved in the District Court order was to establish corporate governance because corporate governance needed to be established.

THE COURT: Exactly. Right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: There is no expression or view on the

part of the debtors in possession, the managing member of the debtors in possession that somehow by virtue of this District Court order Mr. Marwil or any -- the Bayou Entities are immune for cause, appointment under 1104.

THE COURT: Right.

 $$\operatorname{MR}$. SCHWARTZ: We would acknowledge that Your Honor certainly has that power.

The point was that by virtue of the criminal activities there was no governance control over these entities. The creditors, the investor creditors were defrauded out of hundreds of millions of dollars. They took it upon themselves to seek to have a managing member appointed, nor merely receivers, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: And so -- and we appreciate that Your Honor recognizes that distinction.

We just feel that it's -- that there's a continual begging of the question and circular reasoning that there's somehow an issue. There are literally thousands of limited liability companies that are debtors in possession in bankruptcy courts across this country. Each of them has a managing member who signed the petition.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: We happen to have a managing member and ordinarily you might have a secretary of the LLC to certify

that this is the managing member. We happen to have a District Court order, which I think is better. It's adjudicated. He is the managing member, so why he's -- he keeps being referred to as merely receiver and therefore custodian and therefore not the managing member of the debtor in possession when the court order says he is something that we find -- it's hurting this estate is what I'm trying to say.

Yesterday we received information from the FBI enabling us to prepare another 40 adversary proceedings -- 60 adversary proceeding complaints putting into controversy for the benefit of this estate in the aggregate another \$50 million of potential recoveries.

Receiving more papers in this and having to file replies to make sure Your Honor and the record were current on our view and, of course, consulting with our creditors committee we completed and filed approximately 25 complaints yesterday putting into controversy about \$25 million. We would have filed them all yesterday. Now we will file the rest of them today, but that's what this case is about.

And I also want to make clear for the record just that if a trustee is appointed and exclusivity automatically terminates, what Your Honor witnessed with a -- and I don't want to get into this in any detail, but there was a party joining the Office of the United States Trustee in the motion, an adversary proceeding defendant which didn't even allege

standing, didn't even allege being a creditor.

And if exclusivity is terminated, instead of spending the next period collecting the estate as we should because there is a -- there is a substantial undertaking here of collecting not only the fictitious profits but also the principle and we believe give -- under the law, and we're not here to argue the law -- that law today, we'll argue it in the adversary proceedings where it belongs, but we certainly don't want a corporate control contest through competing plans of reorganization and disclosure statements to damage these creditors' prospects from receiving what would otherwise be their optimal recovery in these cases.

So I just felt it's important on the record because that's why we're here. We're not here for any intellectual exercises or control or whatever. We're here to achieve the maximum recoveries for all creditors of these estates.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So we thank Your Honor for your ruling, but we just clearly wanted to acknowledge that if there's any cause basis other than a district court order made him, Mr. Marwil, the managing member as opposed to the more normative process, if there's any basis other than that, we would acknowledge that that's appropriate to be heard by you, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bentley, do forgive me,

sir. I didn't give you an opinion opportunity to be heard, but let me say this. I have read your piece on behalf of the Garfinkels. Your clients are one of the defendants I take it in one of the adversary proceedings. Is that correct?

MR. BENTLEY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I express no view on any of the matters that you've raised. Mr. Schwartz is right. The issues that you have raised are issues to be dealt with in the adversary proceedings as they maybe brought to the Court. They really don't bear on the question of whether or not I have the power to make -- enter an order that would be in defiance of Judge McMahon's order appointing Mr. Marwil.

MR. BENTLEY: I --

THE COURT: That's all. I simply express no view whatever on your -- on the position that you've asserted or the positions.

I don't even express a view on what I've previously written on the subject and whether or not it's applicable here. I don't even remember what I wrote in that other opinion, so all of that is tabula rasa, and we'll take it up at the appropriate time.

MR. BENTLEY: Understood, Your Honor. And if I may very briefly, the reason we put it in a pleading was not to argue that that gave you power. It was that in the event Your Honor concluded you had the power then there would be an

it's that I have lack of jurisdiction to decide the issue.

MS. AUSTIN: Basically, it --

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enter an order which would completely change and undermine the order entered by Judge McMahon. And if I did have the power to do that, I wouldn't do it because I view Judge McMahon's order as not as simply appointing a custodian or a receiver, but as appointing the new management of these debtors, management to -- which is expressly enjoined by Judge McMahon to act as manager of debtor in possession with regard to each of these entities. It is not the role of a receiver -- it is not merely the role of a custodian or a receiver.

We have new management and Mr. Marwil is the new management. That's basically my ruling. You can simply refer to the written record without attempting to rearticulate any of the inarticulate things that I've said.

MS. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor, for the clarification.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel for the creditors' committee, do forgive me. I didn't hear from you either.

MR. KIRBY: Well, I would just simply state because the Counsel at that time for the moving cred -- unofficial creditors' committee, this order was prepared at the broadest possible notice, and Judge McMahon directed us during the course of the proceedings to renotice it to every person that we could possibly know including this -- the United States -- United States Attorney's Office, the regulatory agencies that

had brought the proceedings, so this was done on the broadest possible notice.

And I would simply say -- admit that having the creditors having gone to the burden and expense of having done this, it seems to us that if some other arm of the United States believes that they need to be heard in these things they have to take that up within their own laws. We cannot do anything more than provide the United States officials with copies and notice and the United States was specifically asked and they approved this order in its present form. And so I'd just like the record to reflect that.

THE COURT: It's a point is well taken.

MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor, I'd just note for the record that the Office of the United States is a separate and distinct office than, say, the Attorney General's Office, other arms of the Department of Justice.

We are -- and that's for a purpose, because we are the watch dog for the bankruptcy cases. Imagine if we were deemed to be the same as the Attorney General's Office, who represents like the IRS in bankruptcies. There would be a conflict, so we are deemed to be very separate from that, and I just say that for what it's worth.

THE COURT: Well, you know, if you're going to take this up with the District Court, you'd better at least be prepared to argue that the District Court doesn't have the

power to put in place new management because that's essentially what you're arguing here, it seems to me. You haven't really argued that. As I asked you at the very first question, you haven't argued that there's any infirmity, any legal infirmity of any sort in Judge McMahon's order. I don't think there is, but if there is, it's got to be addressed either in the district court or the circuit court, but not this court. Thank you all very much. MS. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good day.

I certify that the foregoing is a court transcript from an electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Ruth Ann Hager Dated: June 30, 2006